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robert p. saldin

Foreign Affairs and Party Ideology in
America: The Case of Democrats and
World War II

While running for president in 1968, George Wallace frequently said that
“there ain’t a dime’s worth of difference between the two parties.” The American party system, he suggested, was rigged to present voters with two versions
of the same thing; voters simply were not offered real alternatives. Though it
seems doubtful that Wallace surveyed the literature before opining, his argument was firmly rooted in a vast and time-tested scholarship. It has often
been said that ideological differences—at least any of a serious or fundamental nature—are lacking in the American political tradition. Recently, however, scholars have paid more attention to the ideological component of
political parties and challenged the consensus thesis. The most prominent
and comprehensive work in this area has demonstrated that American political parties do have reasoned, observable, evolving, and oppositional ideologies. However, this scholarship has generally focused exclusively on “domestic
policy ideologies.” As a result, the critical and interconnected role that international events—and particularly wars—have played in the development of
party ideology has not been fully recognized.
In one sense, this omission is not surprising because, as David R. Mayhew
and Ira Katznelson have recently noted, many scholars studying the United
States limit their causal variables to those that can be found within the
nation’s borders.1 Regrettably, this narrow approach leaves out an enormous
explanatory factor: foreign wars. The underappreciation of major U.S. wars as
a causal variable in the domestic realm limits our understanding of American
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politics and government. For scholars of American political development
and policy history, the domestic and international realms are too often
treated as separate entities, existing independently of each other. Like brief
thunderstorms, international events are cast as temporary distractions that
can make the lights flicker on Capitol Hill; but once the storms pass, normal
business resumes unperturbed and in accordance with previously scheduled
events.
What follows is, in part, an attempt to take up the scholarly call to arms
by Mayhew, Katznelson, and others. I do so by exploring the relationship
between international influences and party ideology. Wars, offering the most
profound kind of foreign influence, are an obvious place to begin. I argue
here that World War II offers a prime case study of this relationship and that
it was a major contributing factor in the Democratic Party’s ideological shift
away from economic populism and toward inclusion and solidarity.

ideology, rhetoric, and american political parties
Political scientist Louis Hartz argued that, in stark contrast to Europe, a classical liberal consensus was firmly planted in American culture, and that any
party differences were minor and played out within the narrow confines of
that ideological box.2 Historians such as Richard Hofstadter and Daniel
Boorstin led the “consensus school,” which articulated a similar lack of ideological conflict.3 Hofstadter touched on political parties in making his broader
consensus argument: “It is in the nature of politics that conflict stands in the
foreground,” he wrote. But the “fierceness of the political struggles has often
been misleading; for the range of vision embraced by the primary contestants
in the major parties has always been bounded by the horizons of property
and enterprise.”4
Only in the postreform era have scholars consistently focused on ideology as a central component of political parties. While studies emphasized the
absence of intraparty ideological cohesion and lack of interparty ideological
conflict in much of the post–World War II era, more recent research shows
that in the post–1968–72 period, the parties have become more ideologically
cohesive internally and more polarized comparatively.5 Congressional studies
are paying more attention to ideology, many noting the increasing ideological
cohesion of the caucuses.6 The elections and voting literature notes a revival
in parties, partisanship, and ideological voting at the individual level.7 Other
studies explore ideology and parties in the states.8 Scholars are also addressing

ROBERT

p.

SALDIN

|

389

the role of intraparty factions, considering, among other things, their ideological influences on the larger parties.9 Several factors have been cited as
drivers of party ideology, including economics and social class, ethnicity and
culture, critical realignments, and elite-led responses to various domestic
events.10 John Gerring aptly summarizes this literature: “To put it baldly, the
premise of nonideological parties no longer seems to fit the facts as we know
them. Indeed, contemporary work by political scientists and historians points
toward a new understanding of ideology’s involvement in American party
politics.”11
The most comprehensive account of party ideologies comes from Gerring.12 Challenging the consensus school (that is, a lack of ideological distinction between parties), he argues that from 1828 onward the Republicans (or
their Whig precursors prior to 1860) and the Democrats have offered coherent, identifiable, and changing ideologies in opposition to each other. Gerring’s thorough account concludes with a consideration of the factors that
drive this partisan change. Ultimately, he finds there “is no general factor”
and that “lots of things” drive ideological shifts.13 Yet international influences
are notably absent from Gerring’s extensive list of “lots of things.” To his
credit, he directly explains his exclusive focus on domestic factors, arguing
that “because foreign policy has rarely played a significant role in American
electoral politics, I focus primarily on domestic policies.” He continues in a
footnote:
Foreign policy issues have entered debate at infrequent intervals
(generally under conditions of open or imminent military conflict)
after which politics has resumed its normal pace and usual domestic
preoccupations. … Party views on foreign policy have not corresponded neatly with the historical development of party views on
domestic policy matters; which is to say, foreign policy ideologies
have changed at different times and (often) for different reasons than
domestic policy ideologies. Therefore, foreign policy provides a
somewhat misleading guide to the public political identities of the
American parties, and is best analyzed separately.14
But it is far from clear that major foreign policy issues have been “rare” and
“infrequent.” In its approximately 220 years as a country, the United States has
fought “hot” wars for more than 40 of those years, was immersed in the Cold
War for decades, and has been involved in numerous smaller international
conflicts. This consideration suggests that exploring domestic and foreign
policy ideologies in isolation is problematic.
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Argument and Methodological Approach
The problem with excluding any consideration of foreign policy is that it omits
a critical variable in understanding party ideologies. Major wars, in particular,
have been an ongoing and significant influence on domestic American politics. I argue here that events in the form of foreign wars can alter party ideology because they reshape the political landscape, thereby compelling political
parties to alter their governing philosophies. In other words, wars force the
dimension of international relations into the ideological package.
This thesis builds on Gerring’s typology by presenting a case study of
ideological change in the Democratic Party following World War II. The war
helps to explain the Gerring-identified shift in Democratic ideology away
from economic populism. While Gerring is certainly correct that no single
factor can account for all instances of ideological change, World War II was
intimately tied to this particular shift in the Democrats’ public philosophy
and such a link suggests that other wars could have had—and could continue
to have—a similar influence.
I adopt Gerring’s general approach to studying party ideology. He focuses on “presidential parties,” or those elements of a party that “select (or
endorse) a party’s national platform and presidential nominee,” and examines
only the parties’ “public ideology—the words and actions by which leaders
represented their party before the general electorate” (to the exclusion of “private communications, motivations, and interests”).15 That is, this approach
highlights a party’s dominant ideological strain as seen in its national platforms and the rhetoric of its presidents and presidential nominees.
One limitation of this approach is that by focusing only on the dominant
ideological strain within a party, the role played by internal groups or factions
is minimized. While some nuance and historical detail may be lost in this
approach, it carries the benefit of highlighting the dominant and most important ideological thread and is perfectly appropriate for the purpose of developing an historical synthesis of American party ideology. This focus also has
the advantage of speaking directly to Gerring’s scholarship. The value added
here is not in establishing a grand theory of party ideology in this historical
context, but rather in building upon a leading interpretation and in identifying a central source of party ideology overlooked in previous scholarship.
The emphasis on elite rhetoric, despite some of its own limitations, also
offers an effective way to gauge ideology. It is possible, of course, that parties,
presidents, and candidates may alter their rhetoric in front of different audiences.
They may also conceal their “true” beliefs behind crowd-pleasing rhetoric.
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And party platforms may be more indicative of carefully orchestrated,
nonoffending platitudes than realistic statements of where party elites (or
rank-and-file members) actually stand.16 Yet rhetoric is also the conduit
through which parties and political leaders communicate with the public
and, frequently, other elites. As Mark A. Smith argues, rhetoric “is the currency of politics in that everything important passes through it. … It provides
the connecting link between the goals of [political] leaders and their successes, limited in some ways but profound in others, in reshaping electoral
coalitions and changing public policy.”17 As such, rhetoric is an invaluable
source for understanding the development of party ideologies in America.
The rhetoric used here also offers the benefit of creating a level and comparable playing field across time. There is no reason to think that party platforms, campaign speeches, and State of the Union addresses from one year
are any more or less representative than those of another year. Whatever the
limitations of these data sources, they offer consistency. Additionally, the
platforms, candidate speeches, and State of the Union addresses employed
here were all delivered to national audiences, thus limiting instances of atypical pandering before small, homogenous groups. Finally, this approach conforms to that taken by Gerring. To engage his work—the only substantial
study of party ideology throughout American history—it is helpful to proceed, at least initially, on similar methodological grounds.

world war ii and democratic party ideology
Before World War II, Democratic ideology was rooted in class-based populism, but after the war, the party’s ideology was based on universality and solidarity.18 World War II played a critical role in this change. Mobilizing for and
fighting the war required a unified country. The class-based rhetoric Democrats employed prior to the outbreak of hostilities was divisive, pitting different
segments of the country against one another. The war—if only by necessity—
required a new approach that brought people together in solidarity for a
national cause. This need encouraged the party to adopt a more unifying, inclusive ideology that became evident in the war’s aftermath. Various other factors
indirectly tied to the war also bolstered this ideological transformation.

Prewar Democrats
Until recently, there was a general consensus that 1932 marked a critical hinge
point for the Democratic Party. Before Franklin Roosevelt’s election in that
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pivotal year, the party was plagued by constant disputes between its disparate,
and often fundamentally opposed, elements. The party contained natural
combatants: northerners and southerners; urban workers and rural farmers;
nativists and immigrants; progressives and conservatives. In essence, the
Democrats were a motley array of opposing forces unable to unify around a
coherent ideology.19
All this changed, the standard view maintains, in 1932. Roosevelt not
only saved the nation from the throes of the Great Depression but also
rescued his party from irrelevance. For the first time in decades, the party
had an identifiable ideology centered around the public philosophy of
the welfare state.20 Internal fissures did not disappear, but the majority of
Democrats were united in their support for redistributive social and
economic policies, statism, and science.21 As political scientist Sidney Milkis
has argued, Roosevelt’s reinterpretation of America’s “liberal” ideals marked
a profound break with the nation’s limited government tradition. Prior to the
1930s, liberalism had always been linked to “Jeffersonian principles and the
natural rights tradition of limited government drawn from Locke’s Second
Treatise and the Declaration of Independence. Roosevelt pronounced a new
liberalism in which constitutional government and the natural rights tradition were not abandoned but linked to programmatic expansion and an activist national government.”22
Political scientists James Morone and John Gerring, however, argue that
the transition was not quite so seamless. Morone notes that while the administrative state was greatly expanded under FDR, this was merely a natural
response to the Depression: “The New Deal administrative inventions did not
break sharply with the past. Roosevelt left behind a far greater government,
but not one fundamentally different from … that he found.”23 Gerring builds
on Morone’s analysis by demonstrating that the New Deal was the outgrowth
of Bryanism and Wilsonianism and that the party’s ideology fundamentally
changed not with Roosevelt and the New Deal, but following World War II.
Gerring reframes the period by identifying the Democratic Party’s ideological hinge point in the late 1940s.24 Contrary to the traditional view, Gerring
maintains that the party was unified from the Bryan era on. “There was more
cohesion and continuity within Democratic ideology between 1896 and 1948
than is generally recognized. This ideology was not oriented on Jefferson, nor
was it oriented on the technocratic management of the welfare state; rather it
was Populist in tone and policy.”25
Prewar Democrats were tied together by a belief in market regulation
and wealth redistribution based on the public-interest model of evangelical
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Christianity. Democratic ideology was rooted “in the ideal of majority rule
and in the populist narrative in which the people fought for their rights
against an economic and political elite. … From 1896 to 1948, Democratic
candidates sounded the bell of political and economic freedom and advocated for the rights of the common man.”26 Policy proposals, invoking the
language of reform, were tailored to benefit and appeal to the “people.” Monopolies and big business were targeted because they purportedly operated in
opposition to the people’s interests.27
All this, of course, is not to suggest that the 1932 election and the New
Deal were unimportant for the Democratic Party. Indeed, the standard view
is certainly correct that key aspects of the party looked very different after
1932. As Milkis argues, the presidency and its relationship to the party system
were profoundly affected, and New Deal policies created a federal government that was a much more prominent and vital feature of Americans’ daily
lives.28 Yet the vast expansion of government during the 1930s was characterized by experimentation in direct response to the Great Depression—not a
coherent, planned set of policy initiatives long envisioned by Roosevelt. Federal government intervention was initially conceived of as a temporary solution to a crisis and, even then, only after Roosevelt realized that traditional
solutions such as balancing the budget would be insufficient.29 Governing
around a welfare state did not fully emerge within the Democratic Party until
the 1960s. In sum, as Gerring argues, pre–World War II Democrats were,
from a purely ideological standpoint, rooted in a public philosophy of classbased rhetorical appeals pitting the “people” against the “interests.”

Postwar Democrats
How, then, was Democratic ideology different after World War II? Most simply,
a new strain of universality and solidarity emerged that was not present in the
party’s public philosophy before the war, and it proved to be an important and
enduring feature of its popular appeals.30 Equality came to be associated with
inclusion and formed the basis for postwar Democratic ideology. Gerring writes:
[In] the wake of World War II, the party’s egalitarian agenda was
broadened to include a host of social groups and political issues that
did not fit neatly into the socioeconomic perspective and the massesversus-elites dichotomy of the Populist period. Equality in the 1890s
or the 1930s did not mean the same thing as equality in the 1950s and
1960s. Forsaking the shrill polemics of Bryan, the party now adopted
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a soothing tone and reassuring demeanor. The rhetoric of reconciliation replaced that of resentment. The all-inclusive American People
subsumed the figure of the Common Man. … The organizing theme
of Democratic ideology changed from an attack against special privilege to an appeal for inclusion. Party leaders rewrote the Democratic hymn-book; Populism was out, and Universalism was in.31
Tolerance, understanding, and inclusion became key components of the
Democratic platform, which stood in stark contrast to the divisive “people vs.
the powerful” rhetoric that preceded it.
Two specific changes in Democratic ideology—one rooted in economic
policy, particularly with regard to labor issues, and one rooted in minority
rights—are evident in the postwar epoch and differentiate the party’s prewar
and postwar eras. During the first half of the century, Democrats embraced
organized labor and the working man and rhetorically pitted them against
business interests. But postwar Democrats worried less about capitalism’s excesses because John Maynard Keynes and John Kenneth Galbraith persuaded
them that regulatory measures were sufficient to avoid serious economic depressions.32 Historian Alan Brinkley articulates the scope of the transformation. By the end of the war, he argues, “The concept of New Deal liberalism
had assumed a new form. … [Its adherents] largely ignored the New Deal’s
abortive experiments in economic planning, its failed efforts to create harmonious associational arrangements, its vigorous … antimonopoly and regulatory crusades, its open skepticism toward capitalism and its captains, its overt
celebration of the state.”33 In sum, liberal Democrats came to fully embrace
capitalism. The lessons learned during the war, combined with previous New
Deal policies, led to a dramatic softening of their prior economic views.
Also in the economic realm, the party became increasingly amenable to
business in the 1950s, while organized labor became something of an electoral
liability to the extent that candidates went to great lengths to demonstrate
that they were not beholden to the American Federation of Labor or the Congress of Industrial Organizations. As Gerring explains, Populist-era Democrats employed “shrill cries against the depredations of ‘monopoly,’ ‘big
business,’ and ‘usurious’ business practices. In the postwar era, the party
dropped its litany of economic protest themes. … Democrats’ embrace of ‘the
American capitalistic system’ was, for the first time in party history, unalloyed by Jeffersonian suspicions.”34 The party gradually reduced labor’s influence, culminating in an altered method of selecting presidential candidates.
By 1972, the Democratic nominee was chosen through primary elections. As
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such, union leaders were no longer able to position themselves as powerful
forces in the “smoke-filled rooms” where candidates were previously chosen.35
Thus, the Democrats had moved from divisive pro-worker, anti-business
rhetoric to a public stance of less support for organized labor coupled with
less criticism of business interests.
The Democrats’ ideological pivot can also clearly be seen in their shift
from focusing on majority rule to emphasizing pluralism and minority
rights.36 As many have pointed out, blacks especially became a consistent feature in the party’s rhetoric.37 Of course, it should be noted that the staunchest
supporters of segregation all hailed from the Democratic Party. Yet, among
those elements of the party supporting racial liberalism (and this became the
dominant strain by at least the 1940s), Gerring’s extensive content analysis
yields interesting findings. Initially, Democrats, especially President Harry
Truman, made an attempt to frame racial issues through the party’s prewar
Populist lens by painting minorities, like laborers, as oppressed common
people dominated by a cabal of powerful economic elites. But by 1948, as seen
in that year’s convention platform, the party had adopted the new and now
familiar frame of “civil rights” and “minority rights”:
The Democratic Party commits itself to continuing its efforts to
eradicate all racial, religious and economic discrimination. We again
state our belief that racial and religious minorities must have the
right to live, the right to work, the right to vote, the full and equal
protection of the laws, on a basis of equality with all citizens as guaranteed by the Constitution. … We call upon Congress to support
our President in guaranteeing these basic and fundamental American principles: (1) the right of full and equal political participation;
(2) the right to equal opportunity of employment; (3) the right of
security of person; (4) and the right of equal treatment in the service
and defense of our nation.38
This rhetorical shift was significant. It demonstrated that these issues were
group-based, rather than afflictions pertaining to the great mass of common
people. A similar group-based emphasis permeated the Democratic approach
to poverty. The class-based rhetoric of Populist era Democrats was replaced
by framing poverty as an abstract “social issue” with complex causes. As
Gerring puts it, “There were still victims—the poor—but no longer any victimizers” like trusts or big business.39
Democrats no longer saw a nation polarized between two classes, a small
economic elite and the masses. The prewar notion of the common people
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now appeared romantic and ill-informed.40 Rather, there existed a vast
middle into which numerous minority groups did not fit, and remedies were
thus required to bring them into the fold. So, while prewar Populist Democrats were focused on bringing down the small economic elite and lifting the
masses, postwar Democrats focused on helping relatively small, targeted
minority groups and were suspicious of the masses who held them down.
Ironically, mass society—once the intended beneficiary of Democratic
efforts—had come to replace the conniving economic elite as the party’s
target.
Gerring provides numerous examples of this new focus throughout the
party’s postwar epoch.41 In addition, this change is clearly reflected in Democratic Party platforms. They frequently began to list a series of particular minority groups along with tangible actions the party or candidate pledged to
take on their behalf.42 The party’s platforms from its prewar Populist era did
not reflect the laundry-list approach that the Democrats adopted in the postwar era.
These two broad factors—economic moderation and group-based minority rights—engendered a Democratic Party based around solidarity and
inclusion. While the prewar Democrats focused on class divisions within
society, the postwar party focused on national unity constructed around a
series of disparate groups. Gerring concludes: “Consensus, tolerance, compromise, pragmatism, and mutual understanding … were the ideals to which
the Democratic leaders aspired, ideals that were central to the party’s [postwar]
weltanschauung, in which all peoples, all faiths, and all lifestyles were
embraced (at least in principle).”43

The Influence of World War II on the Democrats’ Ideological Shift
The primary question left to be addressed is how the ideology of the Democratic Party was transformed from its prewar class-based populism into postwar solidarity and inclusion. In other words, what accounts for Democrats
altering their economic populism in favor of economic moderation and dropping their “people versus the powerful” rhetoric in favor of a group-based,
minority rights approach? World War II played a major role. Most prominently, the war required national unity. Solidarity and cohesiveness were critical in facing what was arguably the nation’s gravest threat. Class-based
divisions were secondary in this age of all-out war and had to be transcended
if the country was to be victorious. This need for national unity made the oldstyle Democratic rhetoric seem out of place and retrograde. In addition,
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World War II was tied up in other factors that Gerring emphasizes. Several
revolved around economics: a long period of economic growth, the rise of the
middle class, the ascendancy of Keynesianism, and the declining influence of
labor unions. The Democratic Party’s ideological shift was also influenced by
the emergence of racial politics, the lack of a challenge from the Left (e.g., the
Communist Party, Huey Long, or the Progressive Party), and the Cold War.44
In sum, multiple factors pushed the Democratic Party toward this major
ideological shift. But a critical point to be noted for present purposes is that
the crisis of World War II contributed directly to the shift by compelling the
party to focus on national unity. In principle, once the war ended, the Democrats could have reverted back to their Populist-era ideological position.
However, the complex and mutually reinforcing relationship between the war
and the factors Gerring emphasizes helped solidify the change.
Wartime Solidarity: World War II’s most important direct effect on the
Democratic Party’s ideological shift arose from the necessity of unifying the
country behind the war effort. The divisive appeals pitting the “common
people” against the “interests” or the economic elite quickly fell out of style after
Japanese bombers attacked the United States.
This rhetorical shift is reflected in the party’s 1936, 1940, and 1944 platforms and in President Roosevelt’s major speeches. These three electoral
years offer a good base for a prewar-postwar comparison. Roosevelt ran as a
sitting president in all three. The first two occurred before the United States
entered World War II, though by 1940 Roosevelt thought it was very possible
that the country would ultimately become involved. The 1944 contest, of
course, occurred several years after the Pearl Harbor attack brought America
into the war.
The 1936 Democratic platform was filled with the party’s then-commonplace
class-warfare appeals. The document is full of pledges on behalf of “the
people” and denunciations of the economic elite:

We hold this truth to be self-evident—that 12 years of Republican
surrender to the dictatorship of a privileged few have been supplanted by a Democratic leadership which has returned the people
themselves to the places of authority. … We shall continue to use
the powers of government to end the activities of the malefactors
of great wealth who defraud and exploit the people. … We have
safeguarded the thrift of our citizens by restraining those who would
gamble with other peoples savings [sic]. … Monopolies and the
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concentration of economic power … continue to be the master of
the producer, the exploiter of the consumer, and the enemy of the
independent operator. … The issue in this election is plain. The
American people are called upon to choose between a Republican
administration that has and would again regiment them in the service of privileged groups and a Democratic administration dedicated to the establishment of equal economic opportunity for all
our people.45
Similarly, as Arthur Schlesinger Jr. notes, President Roosevelt’s 1936
campaign emphasized class-based appeals, focusing on “the economic gains
his Administration had secured [and] appeals to class differences.”46 Roosevelt
emphasized these themes throughout his campaign, often alternating between
the two touchstones from speech to speech.47 An address in New York City on
October 31, 1936, exemplified the class-based theme:
We had to struggle with the old enemies of peace—business and
financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism,
sectionalism, war profiteering. They had begun to consider the Government of the United States as a mere appendage to their own affairs.
We know now that Government by organized money is just as dangerous as Government by organized mob. … They are unanimous in
their hate for me—and I welcome their hatred. I should like to have it
said of my first Administration that in it the forces of selfishness and
of lust for power met their match. I should like to have it said of my
second Administration that in it these forces met their master.48
Roosevelt went on to refer to the financial elites as “tyrants” who “attack the
integrity and honor of American Government itself ” and “campaign against
America’s working people.”49 The key point here is that in the 1936 presidential campaign, the Democratic Party was emphasizing class-based differences.
On one side stood the hard working common people, and on the other the
elites seeking to exploit the less well off and greedily line their own pockets
with the fruits of the working person’s labor.
The 1940 Democratic platform was similar in tone and style to that of
1936. Again there was a lengthy discourse on how the administration had
worked to protect average Americans from the selfish elites. A few illustrative
lines convey the theme:
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We have attacked and will continue to attack unbridled concentration of economic power and the exploitation of the consumer and
the investor. We have attacked the kind of banking which treated
America as a colonial empire to exploit; the kind of securities business which regarded the Stock Exchange as a private gambling club
for wagering other people’s money; the kind of public utility holding
companies which used consumers’ and investors’ money to suborn a
free press, bludgeon legislatures and political conventions, and control elections against the interest of their customers and their security holders.50
In keeping with the party’s standard prewar rhetoric, references to “the
people” and “the average man and woman” were juxtaposed against “the selfish interest of a few” or “a privileged few” bent on “exploitation” as a means to
amass “vast political empires.”51
Roosevelt’s acceptance speech to that national convention, by contrast,
struck a very different note and signaled a crucial shift in his rhetoric. The
President spent nearly the entire address discussing the war in Europe, noting
that it “is not an ordinary war,” that it “threatens all men everywhere,” and
“would of necessity deeply affect the future of this nation.”52 Given this reality,
Roosevelt said he would reluctantly serve a third term. He only briefly
touched on domestic politics and the party’s standard class-warfare theme,
and did so in a remarkably less bellicose manner than had been typical:
We have had to develop … the answers to aspirations which had
come from every State and every family in the land. … Some of us
have labeled it a wider and more equitable distribution of wealth in
our land. It has included among its aims, to liberalize and broaden
the control of vast industries—lodged today in the hands of a relatively small group of individuals of very great financial power. But all
these definitions and labels are essentially the expression of one consistent thought. They represent a constantly growing sense of human
decency, human decency throughout our nation. This sense of
human decency is happily confined to no group or class. … You find
it, to a growing degree, even among those who are listed in that top
group which has so much control over the industrial and financial
structure of the nation.53
Also notable in Roosevelt’s 1940 speech were his appeals for national unity.
The President said, for instance: “National unity in the United States became
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a crying essential in the face of ” Europe’s turmoil. He went on to honor the
sacrifice and national service of private citizens “who have placed patriotism
about all else” by leaving their jobs and homes to protect the country in recent
years.54 In closing, Roosevelt referred to selfishness but not with its usual association with the rich. Rather, he used it to implore all Americans to join
together in opposing the European forces fighting against freedom:
It is the continuance of civilization as we know it versus the ultimate
destruction of all that we have held dear—religion against godlessness; the ideal of justice against the practice of force; moral decency
versus the firing squad; courage to speak out, and to act, versus the
false lullaby of appeasement. But it has been well said that a selfish
and greedy people cannot be free. The American people must decide
whether these things are worth making sacrifices of money, of energy, and of self.55
Thus, while the 1940 Democratic platform echoed the party’s standard classbased, populist themes, Roosevelt’s acceptance speech focused on the war in
Europe, scarcely mentioned class divisions, reached out to the economic elite,
and called for national unity.
Following the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
national unity became central to Roosevelt’s strategy for winning the war.
Any lingering attachment to divisive class-based rhetoric Roosevelt might
have had was quickly discarded. As Roosevelt biographer Kenneth S. Davis
has demonstrated, FDR’s chief worry was that the war “would be forced upon
an America that remained deeply divided ideologically.” As a result, his job as
president “had similarities to that of Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War—
the task of uniting the American people. … He must strive to make of himself
the very personification of the kind of active American union that was vitally
necessary, stressing the positive (all that made for union) while shunning, to
the maximum possible degree, divisive words and deeds.”56 In addition, the
country was swept up in patriotism, which had a unifying force, rendering
class distinctions, at least temporarily, less important.57
Roosevelt’s new focus on solidarity was evident in his annual State of the
Union addresses during World War II when he made more impassioned appeals for national unity and sought to quell domestic divisions. His 1942 address, for example, warned that “we must guard against divisions among
ourselves.”58 Similarly, appearing before Congress one year later, Roosevelt
said: “Fortunately, there are only a few Americans who place appetite above
patriotism. … We Americans intend to do this great job together. In our
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common labors we must build and fortify the very foundation of national
unity—confidence in one another.”59 FDR’s 1944 State of the Union Address
contained similar themes and omitted class-based denunciations—even
when he detailed his new domestic economic plan, which he hoped would
ultimately amount to a “second Bill of Rights.”60 Before the war, such a proposal would almost certainly have been accompanied by stark class-based
rhetoric.
All of these speeches were devoid of anything even approaching an appeal to class differences or denunciations of an economic or political elite. In
short, as far as Roosevelt was concerned, Americans were in this fight together. Winning World War II required a unified effort and there was no
room for internal division. This should not be a surprise. World War II was
such a cataclysmic event that it completely reshuffled the American political
landscape. The bitter class differences that characterized the prewar era
appeared petty and unimportant when the country was faced with war against
Nazism and fascism.
By 1944, the Democratic platform was in line with Roosevelt’s nomination speech four years earlier and his subsequent State of the Union addresses.
There were appeals to unity and conscious efforts to display solidarity. For
instance, the platform stated: “Our gallant sons are dying on land, on sea, and
in the air. They do not die as Republicans. They do not die as Democrats.
They die as Americans.”61 Notably, the prewar theme of helping “the people”
remained, but the once constant references to a greedy oppositional elite were
completely absent. The harshest class-based line stated: “We reassert our faith
in competitive private enterprise, free from control by monopolies, cartels, or
any arbitrary private or public authority.”62
Similarly, Roosevelt’s short 1944 acceptance speech lacked any reference
to the class-based appeals seen before World War II. Rather, the President
emphasized solidarity even in his brief discussion of domestic economics:
“The people of the United States have transcended party affiliation, not only
Democrats but also forward-looking Republicans, and millions of independent voters have turned to progressive leadership, a leadership which has
sought consistently and with fair success to advance the average American
citizen who had been so forgotten during the period after the last war.”63
Remarkably, that sentence about the domestic economy was the closest Roosevelt
came to anything that could be construed as a class-based appeal.
Thus, Democratic platforms and President Roosevelt’s key speeches from
1936 to 1944 demonstrate a profound transition in the party’s rhetoric. The
class-based references that marked the prewar Democratic Party had been
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abandoned. Of course, appeals were still made to average and working Americans but, crucially, the harsh denunciations of the “interests” and the “powerful” were dropped entirely. In their place were statements emphasizing
solidarity and national unity. Gerring suggests that the prewar “people versus
the powerful” rhetoric characterized the Democratic Party until at least 1948.
But interestingly, the only Roosevelt speech Gerring cites after the United
States entered the war does not support this assertion. In response to Republican accusations of communist sympathizers within his administration,
Roosevelt said: “This form of fear propaganda is not new among rabble
rousers and fomenters of class hatred.”64 Gerring’s reliance on this quote to
bridge the gap between 1941 and 1948 is curious because it is starkly different
from the kind of class-based appeals that prewar Democrats made. Rather
than speaking to the majority of average Americans by attacking a selfish and
powerful elite, Roosevelt here seems to have been accusing Republicans of
engaging in divisive class warfare.
In sum, World War II marked the crucial hinge point in Democratic ideology with regard to class antagonisms. The war changed the domestic political landscape and the Democrats responded, altering their rhetoric in crucial
ways. Appeals to class tensions were out. National unity and solidarity were
in. In the aftermath of Pearl Harbor and the subsequent years of military
conflict, class warfare simply did not resonate. In a similar vein, others have
noted that overt efforts were undertaken to increase unity across ethnic lines
and reduce divisive nativism.65 Nationalism and patriotism were the order of
the day. Although class distinctions remained during these years, the country
“rallied around the flag.”66 Class-based appeals have never fully melted away
from the Democrats’ public philosophy (such as Truman in 1948, Gore in
2000, or Edwards in 2008), but they have not returned to claim the central,
dominant role they played in the party’s prewar ideology.
Economic Factors: Overlooking World War II, Gerring identifies several economic
factors (in addition to other influences discussed in the next section) in
explaining the Democratic Party’s ideological shift. Specifically, he asserts that
economic growth, the rise of the middle class, the triumph of Keynesianism,
and the sagging influence of labor unions induced the transformation. These
factors were undeniably important in the Democrats’ shift, but it is worth
noting that the war itself was a contributing and reinforcing factor in these very
economic changes. The war served, along with the economic considerations
Gerring emphasizes, to ensure that the party’s ideological shift endured when,
in principle, it might have reverted to its earlier Populist style.
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The prewar Democratic focus on a “people vs. the powerful” rhetorical
style is much more likely to be successful in an era of vast economic inequality
or a period of economic hardship. Before the war, such appeals had obvious
constituencies: first, poor laborers who worked hard under difficult conditions and then, after 1929, victims of the country’s worst-ever economic
depression. After the war, the burgeoning and dominant middle class of the
late 1940s—fueled by the G.I. Bill—combined with the period’s humming
economy, gave class-based rhetoric less salience.67 To have broad-based
appeal, such rhetoric would have required the endorsement of the freshly
constituted middle class, yet this demographic had new concerns of its own.
As a result, the fierce class-based speech of the prewar Democrats fell on deaf
ears. The natural audience for this message had dissipated.
These developments were reinforced by the Democrats’ adoption of
Keynesianism, the economic theory of maintaining a market-based economy
augmented by governmental policies to promote consumption, increase employment, and stimulate business. While this embrace signaled the collapse
of the hotly contested doctrine of pure laissez-faire economics, it also put the
party in a position of defending the market economy. As David Kennedy
writes, “If earlier liberals conceived of the economy as a mechanism that
needed fixing, the Keynesians thought of the economy as an organism that
needed feeding but that otherwise should be left to its own devices.”68 The
adoption of Keynesianism, then, shifted the Democratic Party’s view of economics in general and of the government’s role in the economy in particular.
Obviously, the full adoption of Keynes’ theories was related to the strong
economic growth and the growing middle class that it helped produce. It was
also tied to the beginning of the end for organized labor.69
Labor unions continued a long, slow decline in influence in the postwar
era. Organized labor had suffered during World War II because of, among
other factors, limits on strikes and internal divisions within the labor movement. Then, following the war, passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, along
with the growing economy and emergence of a strong middle class (which
made the bill viable), all contributed to labor’s dwindling power. Historian
Nelson Lichtenstein places the turning point between 1946 and 1948, when
the union movement’s attempts to shape the postwar economy were stopped
by business interests that by then had become at ease with Democrats.
“Labor’s ambitions were thereafter sharply curbed, and its economic program
was reduced to a sort of militant interest group politics, in which a Keynesian
emphasis on sustained growth and productivity gain-sharing replaced labor’s
earlier commitment to economic planning and social solidarity.”70 The salient
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point that emerges is that the above-referenced economic factors were all intimately tied together. The growing economy and resulting middle class moderated Democrats’ suspicion of capitalism and led them to buy into America’s
market economy—albeit with their New Deal modifications. In addition, the
economy’s vitality proved the feasibility of, and validated the Democrats’
adoption of, Keynesianism. And the Democrats’ newly adopted Keynesian
policies limited their commonalities with organized labor. These developments in turn led to labor’s initial slip.
These related economic factors clearly played a role in the Democratic
Party’s new ideological makeup. Notably, though, World War II contributed
to and reinforced these economic developments. Most economists and historians maintain that the war played an important role in ending the Great
Depression and creating the ensuing strong economy.71 They argue that the
Keynesian-inspired massive federal spending galvanized the economy with
multiplied effects on the civilian sector. As a result, the nation reached full
employment and increased GNP and personal consumption, and out of all
this a strong middle class emerged. Economist Herbert Stein is representative
of this camp. He notes that before the war, the nation was perpetually mired
in stagnation and permanent deficits with no easy solutions. In addition,
there were still ten million people unemployed and there was no prospect
that private investment could significantly mitigate the problem. But “the war
changed all of that dramatically.” Full employment became a reality; the issue
of secular stagnation was put to rest; businessmen became involved in federal
economic policy; the federal debt, enormous budgets, and the pay-as-you-go
tax system were erased; and opposing economic factions were able to unite
behind the war effort. “All of this,” Stein writes, “came about primarily as a
result of conditions created coincidentally and accidentally by the war.”72
A smaller group of scholars contend that World War II’s influence on the
economic recovery was less profound than is generally thought. None contend that it played no role, only that it was not the sole cause. Kennedy, for
instance, says the war worked in tandem with the New Deal. “The New Deal
petered out in 1938. … [Full economic] recovery awaited not the release of
more New Deal energies but the unleashing of the dogs of war. … When the
war brought … a recovery that inaugurated the most prosperous quarter century America has ever known, it brought it to an economy and a country that
the New Deal had fundamentally altered.”73 Economists J. Bradford de Long
and Lawrence H. Summers offer a stronger prewar argument. Utilizing preand postwar output data, they maintain that 80 percent of the economic
recovery had already taken place by 1942. To the extent this is true, “It is hard
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to attribute any of the pre-1942 catch-up of the economy to the war”— though,
as De Long and Summers acknowledge, one could argue that Roosevelt began
wartime mobilization well before the Pearl Harbor attack formally drew the
United States into the war.74 Still another view is offered by economist Robert
Higgs, who argues that the major shift occurred not prior to (or as a result of)
World War II, but in its immediate aftermath. While the war did push the
economy out of the Depression, it did so indirectly. “Certain events of the war
years—the buildup of financial wealth and especially the transformation of
expectations—justify an interpretation that views the war as an event that recreated the possibility of genuine economic recovery. As the war ended, real
prosperity returned.”75 Thus, Higgs argues that the war ended the Great Depression but in a roundabout way. Rather than the war bringing the economic
downturn to an end as most scholars contend, the conflict induced a postwar
boom from 1946 to 1949.76 Clearly, then, there is disagreement over the role
World War II played in ending the Great Depression and initiating a strong
economy. The timing of these effects is also contested. But the important
point to note here is that the war and the economy were, in one way or another, related and mutually reinforcing with regard to the influence they had
on the Democratic Party’s ideology.
The war was also entangled with the Keynesian triumph and its embrace
by Democrats. Economist Tyler Cowen writes: “The onset of the war brought
significant increases in demand and government spending, and eventually,
government control over investment—precisely what Keynes had recommended.”77 As a consequence, instead of merely pointing out the inequalities
and downfalls associated with a pure market economy, Democrats were now
in a position of supporting the economic system. As Brinkley puts it, “Keynes’s
economic doctrines … suggested ways to introduce in peacetime the kinds of
stimuli that had created the impressive wartime expansion. They offered, in
fact, an escape from one of liberalism’s most troubling dilemmas and a mechanism for which reformers had long been groping. They provided a way to
manage the economy without directly challenging the prerogatives of capitalists.”78 That is, the war experience demonstrated that governmental intervention in the private sector was extremely complicated and at some point became
unnecessary. In addition, it showed that vast new regulatory functions were
not required either. Rather, indirect economic oversight through monetary
and fiscal “levers” combined with a moderate welfare state was sufficient.
These initiatives were no longer viewed as temporary solutions to stem the
flow until a more fundamental solution was settled upon. Instead, these
measures had become the solution. The renewed wartime faith in economic
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growth, Brinkley continues, led to “several ideological conclusions of considerable importance to the future of liberalism. It helped relegitimize American
capitalism [among those] who had developed serious doubts about its viability. … It robbed the “regulatory” reform ideas … of their urgency and gave
credence instead to Keynesian ideas.”79
In sum, while the economic changes that Gerring identified clearly
played key causal roles in the Democratic Party’s ideological shift at the end
of the 1940s, World War II just as clearly contributed to and reinforced those
developments.80
Other Factors: Gerring argues that at least three other factors—the emergence
of racial politics, the lack of a leftist challenger, and Cold War anticommunism—
also played a role in the Democratic Party’s postwar ideological shift.81 Yet, like
the economic considerations, these factors were also intertwined with the war
in important ways.
Race played a significant role in altering the Democrats’ ideological position. Traditionally, the party had been rooted in white supremacy, making
this transformation all the more notable. Civil rights did not fit comfortably
into the Democrats’ old majoritarian ideology. Rather, it was a new issue requiring the extension of new rights to a targeted minority group. The party’s
adoption of the issue spurred it to identify other groups in need of rights
extensions.82
While the new attention to civil rights on the national agenda and in the
Democratic Party’s ideology clearly had multiple propellants, African American involvement in the war reinforced its emergence. The black community’s
contribution to the war effort began to alter white attitudes on race.83 In addition, the war galvanized the black community to organize itself by developing
some of the key groups that would lead the civil rights movement in coming
decades.84 And finally, the war spurred a new moral and intellectual environment that was more sympathetic to race issues. Specifically, the intellectual
war against the Nazi regime undermined any ideology of racial supremacy in
the United States by exposing unavoidable contradictions and hypocrisy at
home. For example, several months before the United States even entered the
war, President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill met
in Newfoundland to issue the Atlantic Charter, a brief statement laying out
the eight “common principles in the national policies” of the United States
and Great Britain “on which they base[d] their hopes for a better future for
the world.” One of these principles was respect for “the right of all peoples to
choose the form of government under which they will live; and [the United
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States and Britain] wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to
those who have been forcibly deprived of them.”85 The New Republic summed
up the difficulty, arguing that racial discrimination at home made a “mockery
of the theory that we are fighting for democracy, and we are giving aid and
comfort to the enemy thereby.”86 The editors also worried that whites engaged
in stoking racial tension in cities such as Detroit “were assuredly doing Hitler’s work. We don’t doubt that the story of that riot was told all over Asia,
with Nazi trimmings.”87 Similarly, in 1943, The Nation argued: “It is time for us
to clear our minds and hearts of the contradictions that are rotting our moral
position and undermining our purpose. We cannot fight fascism abroad
while turning a blind eye to fascism at home. We cannot inscribe on our banners: ‘For democracy and a caste system.’ We cannot liberate oppressed peoples while maintaining the right to oppress our own minorities.”88 Liberal
intellectuals, Brinkley notes, started moving “from a preoccupation with
‘reform’ (with a set of essentially class-based issues centering around confronting the problem of monopoly and economic disorder) and toward a preoccupation with ‘rights’ (a commitment to the liberation of oppressed peoples
and groups).”89
As a result of the war-induced factors described above—altered white
attitudes, African American organization, and the changed intellectual climate—tangible policy benefits were achieved. Several labor policies related to
African Americans were initiated as a result of World War II. The number of
blacks working in defense industries skyrocketed during the war and much of
this employment came in higher-paying, skilled jobs. While this transition
resulted primarily from wartime labor shortages, it was due in part to several
federal government initiatives designed to increase African American employment. The War Labor Board, for instance, barred wage differences based
on race in 1943.90 In addition, labor unions restricting black membership
were no longer offered the necessary certifications by the National Labor
Relations Board. Finally, the U.S. Employment Service banned job listings by
race.91 Combined, these policies amounted to what economist William J. Collins
calls “the federal government’s first effort to enforce a wide-ranging antidiscrimination policy.”92
While these employment advances were significant, the most profound
World War II–era policy changes for African Americans occurred in the
realm of voting rights. The Soldier Voting Act of 1942 federalized the right of
soldiers to register and to vote absentee.93 Even more important, though, the
Soldier Voting Act abolished the poll tax. Eliminating the tax, which was
designed to, and had the effect of, decreasing black access to the ballot in
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southern states, was obviously crucial to providing full political participation
to all citizens. Liberals in Congress had been attempting to do away with the
poll tax for several years but had made little headway because bills were
blocked in the Democratic-controlled House Judiciary Committee. But with
the war under way, eliminating the poll tax for soldiers was difficult to oppose
and proponents of the measure emphasized its new relevance. As Florida
Senator Claude Pepper said, eliminating the poll tax for soldiers “would ring
around the world that America was carrying out its professions of democracy.”94 Historian Steven Lawson maintains that it was this new war-related
argument that carried the day. Opponents had no cover to “filibuster [the bill]
because they found it difficult to justify the deprivation of the right to vote
to men fighting for their country.”95 While states would still retain administrative control over absentee voting, the Soldier Voting Act was a turning
point in the campaign for African American voting rights. As Alexander
Keyssar argues, the “federal government’s disapproval of poll taxes had
become a matter of law, and the wartime climate of opinion contributed to
the repeal of the poll tax in Georgia in 1945 as well as to the postwar passage
of state laws exempting veterans from poll taxes.”96 Tellingly, the Soldier
Voting Act marked the first expansion of African American voting rights
since Reconstruction.
Smith v. Allwright, a 1944 U.S. Supreme Court case, carried even more
significance for black voting rights.97 In an 8–1 decision, the Court reversed
1935’s Grovey v. Townsend, which had held that political parties were private
associations and thus not subject to the Fifteenth Amendment’s protections
against racial discrimination.98 Smith, by contrast, declared the so-called white
primary unconstitutional. As Keyssar notes, “The justices were not immune to
events transpiring in the world around them. … They were well aware of the
links between the ideological dimensions of World War II and the exclusion
of blacks from voting in the South.”99 Historian Darlene Clark Hine argues
that the “white primary was one of the first casualties of World War II.”100
Contemporaneous accounts also made the connection. The New York Times
Washington bureau chief Arthur Krock pinned the decision directly on the
altered intellectual environment emanating from the war. “The real reason for
the overturn,” Krock wrote, was that “the common sacrifices of wartime have
turned public opinion and the court against previously sustained devices to
exclude minorities from any privilege of citizenship the majority enjoys.”101
Smith’s results were dramatic. By 1952, more than a million southern blacks were
registered to vote—four times as many as in 1940.102 In sum, World War II played
an important and reinforcing role in elevating the prominence of racial politics.
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Along the same lines, the lack of a significant challenge from the left was
at least partially a consequence of the economic factors addressed above.
Before the war, there was no shortage of left-wing challengers, including the
Union Party, Huey Long, the American Labor Party, and the Communist
Party. The strong postwar economy and developing middle class limited the
constituency to which such leftists could easily appeal.
Another factor in the Democrats’ ideological shift was Cold War anticommunism. It, too, was partially linked to the war. As Kennedy asserts,
“World War II led directly to the Cold War and ended a century and a half
of American isolationism.”103 Indeed, World War II initiated an ongoing era
of involvement in international relations. Much of the U.S. desire to stay
engaged in world affairs emanated out of the war. Because the war affected
the United States so profoundly and in so many ways, the country sought to
do everything in its power to minimize the chances of a similar future war.
It laid plans for a world deliberative body similar to Wilson’s rejected
League of Nations. In addition, the United States sought not only to rebuild
benign versions of Germany and Japan, but also to export the ideology of
democracy and capitalism. In short, World War II changed America’s position in, and view of, the world. A widespread consensus developed that
authoritarianism had to be confronted lest a Hitler-like figure be allowed
to emerge again.104
World War II also changed the Soviet Union. For starters, the war was
felt much more deeply in the USSR than in the United States. The Soviet
Union was left in ruins with roughly 27 million fatalities—90 times the
number of American dead. Joseph Stalin emerged from the war, like his
U.S. counterparts, determined to avoid another conflict on that scale. He
also felt the USSR was entitled to compensation for its wartime losses but,
due to its devastation, the country was in no position to unilaterally take
what it wanted. There was, however, a silver lining from Stalin’s perspective. Steeped in Marxist-Leninist ideology, he believed capitalism was
bound to destroy itself. Stalin thought that once the war ended, Britain
and the United States would have no further reason to cooperate and capitalism’s inherent flaws would emerge and plunge its practitioners into
another depression. At that point, Stalin theorized, the Soviets could take
over Europe as Hitler had amid squabbling capitalists in the aftermath of
World War I.105
Thus, the postwar world sported the newly, but fully, engaged United
States, on the one hand, as the planet’s leading champion of freedom, and, on
the other, a devastated, but entitled, Soviet Union as the most authoritarian
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nation on Earth biding its time for its rightful ascension over all of Europe. In
this sense, World War II was very much at the root of the Cold War world that
developed in its aftermath. It is difficult to know if this ideological confrontation would have eventually emerged without World War II because those
years shaped both countries in ways that made the Cold War so much more
likely, if not unavoidable. Admittedly, this tie is indirect. And, admittedly, the
Cold War itself influenced Democratic ideology. Nonetheless, World War II
played a role in setting the stage for this superpower confrontation.
This new international climate—which reinforced domestic anticommunism in the United States—had reverberations on the Democrats’ ideological
repositioning. Gerring succinctly writes: “It is difficult to overestimate the
effects of the Cold War, which helped marginalize the left and legitimate the
right; which seemed to vindicate the (Republican) perspective that statism,
not individualism, was the primary enemy of the American public; and which
granted foreign policy an ascendance over domestic policy that it had rarely
enjoyed.”106 This consideration—along with the economic factors—may also
help explain why Republicans enjoyed relative ideological stability in this period of Democratic flux.
It was this powerful anticommunist sentiment in the wake of World War
II that created such a difficult environment for labor (and leftists in general)
and provided yet another reason for its marginalization. Anticommunist rhetoric became an animating point for Democrats following the war. Preventing communism from taking hold on the home front was of particular
concern.107 Typical of this new mind-set was Democratic presidential nominee Adlai Stevenson’s 1952 acceptance speech:
I suggest that we would err, certainly, if we regarded communism as
merely an external threat. Communism is a great international conspiracy and the United States has been for years a major target. …
Communist agents have sought to steal our scientific and military
secrets, to mislead and corrupt our young men and women, to infiltrate positions of power in our schools and colleges, in business firms
and in labor unions and in the Government itself. At every turn they
have sought to serve the purposes of the Soviet Union. … Along
the way they have gained the help, witting or unwitting, of many
Americans. … I fear there are still people in our country under illusions about the nature of this conspiracy abroad and at home. …
Communism is committed to the destruction of every value which
the genuine American liberal holds most dear. So I would say to any
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Americans who cling to illusions about communism and its fake utopia: Wake up to the fact that you are in an alliance with the devil.108
The key point here is that communism and socialism had become public
enemy number one for the Democrats. And organized labor—perhaps unfairly, but nonetheless—paid a price. In stark contrast to its prewar stance, the
private sector became a point of pride for Democrats and they distanced
themselves from labor. As Stevenson said later in his campaign: “We are for
private, and profitable, business. The Democratic Party is against socialism in
our life in any form—creeping, crawling or even the imaginary kind which
shows up so often in the Republican oratory. I am opposed to socialized medicine, socialized farming, socialized banking, or socialized industry.”109 While
he did not single out labor, the implication was unavoidable: the Democratic
Party was not going to support much of the action that labor sought. This
development was a striking departure from the party’s prewar position. Thus,
this new anticommunist focus played a role in labor’s demise along with
Keynesianism, the strong economy, and the burgeoning middle class.
In sum, the Democrats’ ideology changed dramatically after World War
II. It focused less on the populism associated with the first half of the century
and took on an ideology based on solidarity and universality. These postwar
Democrats were more economically conservative. In addition, they focused
on minority rights as a means of inclusion and dispatched with their prior
rhetoric trumpeting class warfare. And World War II had a profound influence on this ideological shift. It directly created an environment requiring
national unity that discredited divisive class-based appeals. The war also
influenced and reinforced other factors explaining the Democrats’ ideological shift, including economic growth, a developing middle class, Keynesianism, the decline of organized labor, the emergence of racial politics, the
absence of a leftist challenge, and the Cold War.

conclusion
The ideological component of American political parties has received
increased attention in recent decades. Scholars have posited various sources
of party ideology, including class-based economics, ethnicity and culture,
critical elections, and various elite-driven initiatives. Left out of these accounts is a role for international events.
Major wars shape and change party ideologies by recasting the political
landscape and, as a result, forcing political parties to alter their governing
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philosophies. In other words, wars drive the element of international relations into
political parties’ public philosophies. The focus here has not been on promoting
an overarching theory to explain party ideology, but in isolating and explaining a
key source of party ideology that has not received adequate attention.
The importance of foreign policy in party ideology can be seen through
an examination of the World War II–era Democrats. A significant shift occurred in the late 1940s. As John Gerring describes, prewar Democrats were
rooted in class-based populist rhetoric pitting “the people” against powerful
and entrenched elites. Following World War II, the party’s ideology has been
characterized by inclusion. The war was a key contributing factor in this major
shift. Most important, the war effort required national solidarity, which
undermined and negated the often fierce and divisive prewar Democratic rhetoric. Accordingly, the party adopted a more unifying and inclusive public
philosophy as is evident in the party’s platforms and President Roosevelt’s
speeches. World War II also contributed to and reinforced the economic prosperity that made the Democrats’ “people vs. the powerful” rhetoric less salient
with the newly expanded middle class. The humming economy was also
linked to the ruling Democrats and, thus, led them to embrace the success of
their Keynesian-style capitalism even more fully and in a way they previously
had not. The war also was intertwined with, and played a reinforcing role in,
several other factors that simultaneously pushed Democrats toward this ideological shift, including the emergence of racial politics, the lack of a challenge
from the Left, and the new era of Cold War anticommunism.
Because wars are such major events with the frequently realized capacity
to fundamentally shift the country’s political landscape, it is natural for political parties to adjust their ideologies to the new terrain. Other scholars have
touched on this point. Martin Shefter has argued that by presenting threats
and opportunities to various groups in the American population, international conflicts have generated the cleavages that have shaped party structure
and competition.110 Such a framework for understanding party politics has
clear ideological implications. More directly, John W. Compton has argued
that Republican ideology shifted due to the Spanish-American War. The
GOP’s thirty-year focus on the strategic and commercial benefits of foreign
engagement, he maintains, was dispatched in favor of a new mission to aid
foreigners.111 Other instances of war-induced shifts in party ideology could
be explored in future research. For instance, the Vietnam War’s influence on
the rise of the “New Politics” Democrats could be examined as a possible
source of lasting significance in the party’s ideology—especially with regard
to Democratic positioning on foreign affairs and identity politics.
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The case presented here was highlighted because it was a particularly
important and enduring shift, and because it so clearly displays the way in
which wars can alter a party’s ideology. More research that encompasses both
foreign and domestic policy is needed in order to gain a complete picture of
party ideology. Such work should ideally be comprehensive and address party
ideology on both of these fronts—as parties themselves are forced to do—
rather than isolate a domestic ideology and a foreign affairs ideology. In the
real world of politics, these arenas influence one another and cannot be
divorced. Scholarly attempts to do so will yield only a partial and distorted
picture of parties and their ideological makeup.
University of Montana
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